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Abstract
In a famous paper in Noûs in , John Perry points out that action depends
on indexical beliefs. In addition to “third-person” information about her envi-
ronment, an agent need “first-person” information about where, when and who
she is. This conclusion is widely interpreted as a reason for thinking that tensed
claims cannot be translated without loss into untensed language; but not as a rea-
son for realism about tensed facts. In another famous paper in the same volume
of Noûs, Nancy Cartwright argues that action requires that agents represent their
world in causal terms, rather than merely probabilistic terms: for, Cartwright
argues, there’s a distinction between effective and ineffective strategies, that oth-
erwise goes missing. This is widely taken as a reason for thinking that causal
claims cannot be translated without loss into merely probabilistic claims; and
also – in contrast to Perry’s case – widely regarded as a reason for realism about
causation. In this paper I ask whether the latter conclusion is compulsory, or
whether, as in Perry’s case, the need for causal beliefs might merely reflect some
“situated” aspect of a decision-maker’s perspective.
 Two bits of Noûs from 
In his well-known paper ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’ – the first article in
Vol.  ofNoûs in  – John Perry points out that action depends on indexical beliefs.
In addition to “impersonal” or “third-personal” information about her environment,
an agent need “situated” or “first-personal” information – information about the “I,
here and now” of her situation. If she wants to get to a meeting, and believes that it
starts at :pm, it takes the belief that it is now :pm to get her moving.
Perry, J. . ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs , –.

Note that Perry is not offering this as a reason for thinking that the world contains
additional indexical facts or ontology, over and above the facts properly recorded on
non-indexical maps. Some people may believe that there are additional facts of this
kind – at least in the temporal case, some people certainly claim to believe something
like this. But this isn’t Perry’s claim. Rather, Perry is revealing to us a fact about
the cognitive foundations of action: the fact that it requires first-personal, situated
thoughts, as well as third-personal, unsituated thoughts. This is a psychological dis-
covery, not a metaphysical discovery. It is a reason for thinking – contrary to what
was widely believed at the time, apparently – that indexical talk cannot be translated
without loss into non-indexical talk. But it isn’t a reason for populating the world with
indexical ontology.
In another famous paper in the same volume of Noûs, Perry’s (then) Stanford col-
league, Nancy Cartwright, argues that action requires that agents represent their world
in causal terms, rather than merely probabilistic terms; for, Cartwright argues, there’s a
distinction between effective and ineffective strategies, that otherwise goes missing.
Cartwright begins with the familiar distinction between laws of association and
causal laws. Noting Russell’s argument that, as she puts it, ‘laws of association are
all the laws there are, and that causal principles cannot be derived from the causally
symmetric laws of association’, she goes on to argue ‘in support of Russell’s second
claim, but against the first.’ (: ) She agrees with Russell that ‘[c]ausal laws
cannot be reduced to laws of association’, but maintains that ‘they cannot be done
away with’. (: ) Cartwright’s argument for the latter conclusion is that causal
laws are needed to ground an ‘objective’ distinction between effective and ineffective
strategies. She illustrates this distinction with some ‘uncontroversial examples’. The
most famous concerns a letter she received from an insurance company (Figure ).
Figure : Cartwright’s example – the letter from TIAA
Cartwright notes that the objective fact reported in this letter – viz., that buying
life insurance from this company would be an ineffective strategy for living longer –
Though it isn’t easy to characterise exactly what they believe, in my view.
Cartwright, N. . ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies’, Noûs, , –.

depends on causal rather than merely probabilistic facts about the world. But, she
argues, the ‘objectivity of strategies requires the objectivity of causal laws’. In other
words,
causal laws cannot be done away with, for they are needed to ground the dis-
tinction between effective strategies and ineffective ones. . . . [T]he difference
between the two depends on the causal laws of our universe, and on nothing
weaker. (: )
In this case, then, the conclusion is supposed to be metaphysical, rather than psycho-
logical. This is intended to be an argument for realism about causal powers, not merely
a point about the cognitive architecture of deliberating agents.
Comparing these two pieces of Noûs from , it is hard not to be struck by
a strange mix of analogy and disanalogy. On the analogical side, both Perry and
Cartwright argue that beliefs of one sort are not reducible to beliefs of another sort.
In both cases, moreover, the argument turns on the role that the former (irreducible)
beliefs play in action. But on the disanalogical side, as I’ve noted, the intended morals
of the two stories are quite different: in one case, an argument for realism about causa-
tion, in the other, a discovery about the cognitive foundations of agency.
This paper is motivated by the question whether the “metaphysical” interpretation
of Cartwright’s data is compulsory – whether there isn’t a “Perry option” in this case,
too. In other words, couldn’t the causal representations required by agents be in some
sense “merely indexical” – features of the way agents need to conceptualise their world,
rather than features of the world itself? Couldn’t Cartwright’s observation rest on an
“effective indexical”?
The rest of the paper goes like this. In the next section I say more about Perry’s
“essential indexicals”, with which I’m aiming to compare causation: about why they’re
essential, and especially about why we shouldn’t interpret that fact as supporting an
ontological view of indexicality. I’ll also introduce a further species of temporal index-
icality, to which I’ll make some appeal in considering the causal case.
I’ll then turn to the causal case, and try to show that analogous considerations sup-
port a non-ontological view of causal judgements (and in particular of the distinction
on which Cartwright’s observation depends). Finally, to situate my view, I compare it
to a characterisation JimWoodward offers of his own manipulability view of causation,
in a section of his recent book in which he aims to contrast it with the apparently more
Woodward, J. . Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, New York: Oxford
University Press.

subjective view that Peter Menzies and I once defended. I’ll argue that the intuitions
about the objectivity of causal judgements to which Woodward appeals have analogues
in the Perry indexical case, too: a fact which suggests that they are not inconsistent
with an indexical interpretation of causality.
 Perry’s indexicals: why essential, why not ontological?
. Why “essential”?
Why are indexicals “essential”? In brief, because we are “located” creatures: located
in temporal and “personal” space, as well as “spatial space”. It is worth noting that
while Perry stresses the importance of our location (in all these respects) as agents – he
focusses on the role of indexical beliefs in the explanation of action – the same point
also applies on the input side. Located observers need indexical beliefs, too, in order
properly to record the information they gather on “third-personal” maps.
For contemporary audiences, a helpful intuition pump is provided by “virtual
worlds”, such as Second Life. In these cases, it is easy to see how access to all the
third-person information about the game isn’t sufficent to enable one actually to play.
One also needs locating information about one’s own avatar: which one it is, and where
and presumably when it is, within the space (or spacetime) provided by the game.
. Why not “ontological”?
There are three main kinds of argument that count in favour of the non-ontological
diagnosis of Perry’s observations – i.e., in favour of not concluding that these observa-
tions call for indexical facts or states of affairs. I’ll call the combination of these factors
the Three-fold Path to indexicality:
. Variability. Confronted with what looks initially like a label for an objective
feature of the environment, we discover that differently located creatures use the
“same” indexical term to pick out different places, times or people. The cases in
question are too systematic to be dismissed as accidental ambiguities, and there’s
Menzies, P. & Price, H., . ‘Causation as a Secondary Quality’, British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science , –.
In both cases, the crucial point is to identify a distinctive functional role for indexical beliefs, of a
kind that couldn’t be replicated by some suitable application of an account of the functions of belief in
general. It is this conclusion that implies that we need something new in our cognitive architecture at
this point – something tailor-made for the functional role in question.

an apparent symmetry among these different uses of the same term – no one
speaker appears privileged. Breaking this symmetry is not out of the question. It
is the option embraced by presentists, in the temporal case (and presumably by
solipsists in the personal case), who claim priority for just one of the standpoints
concerned. Whatever the merits of this option in the temporal case, it is clearly
unattractive in the other cases. Hence the appeal of the non-ontological view,
which – by locating the variability at the conceptual or “mode of presentation”
level – avoids the need to break the symmetry.
It might be thought that there is an intermediate possibility, that of restoring the
symmetry at the ontological level by reading indexical claims in relational terms.
But Perry’s essential point is that this option won’t do. If we try to cash the
indexical term “I” as a relational term “I-for-X ”, then either “X” itself is indexical
(as in “I-for-me”), or it isn’t (as in “I-for-HP”). In the former case we’ve made no
progress, while in the latter case we’ve lost the essential indexical – what Perry’s
examples show is precisely that relational beliefs cast in such non-indexical terms
will miss a crucial element in the explanation of actions.
. Parsimony. The previous argument appealed to symmetry at the level of (actual
or possible) users of indexical terms, arguing that where there is the relevant
kind of Variability, no one user (or equivalence class of users) has any claim to
priority. This argument appeals to a corresponding symmetry in the world –
i.e., to the attractions of not having to accept that one time, place or person
is ontologically privileged. The non-ontological interpretation thus claims an
attractive economy, perhaps backed up by physics.
. Genealogy. To avail ourselves of the attractions advertised by two previous ar-
guments, however, we need to show that we can explain the relevant linguistic
and psychological phenomena, without the postulate that the function of index-
ical terms and beliefs is to represent indexical ontology. This is the genealogical
Is there another ontological option, preserving the symmetry by allowing the ontology itself to be
indexical? Perhaps, but unless the ontology is question is the kind of deflationary ontology we get for
free on the back of language games, it is going to have trouble with the next two steps in the Three-fold
Path.
More precisely, Perry’s argument shows that there’s a functional role played by indexical beliefs
which cannot be simulated by in any generic way by non-indexical beliefs – i.e., which cannot be
engineered simply by plugging some suitable content into a model of the cognitive functions of beliefs in
general. The functional difference in question is not therefore merely a product of a difference in content,
but needs to be regarded as a primitive difference in use. Indexical concepts hook into our functional
architecture in some distinctive way, which can’t be simulated by wholly non-indexical concepts.

aspect of Perry’s project – the task of explaining the use of indexical vocabu-
lary, without assuming indexical ontology. And it is an essential ingredient of an
argument for a non-ontological interpretation of the data.
. Some working assumptions about time
The non-ontological interpretation of Perry’s data treats now as merely indexical. For
the remainder of the paper I want to take for granted what I’ll call Boltzmann’s hypothe-
sis, viz., that the direction of time is also indexical – also ‘in the eye of the beholder’, as it
were. There are objective temporal asymmetries, of course, at least in our region of the
universe – the second law of thermodynamics describes the most prominent of these
– but I’m going to assume that these don’t establish any objective sense of temporal
priority; in particular, they don’t provide any objective sense in which (what we call)
the future arises out of (what we call) the past, rather than vice versa. In so far as our
ordinary temporal conception embodies a stronger sense of directionality, it is a feature
of our representation of the temporal world, rather than a feature of the world as it is
in itself. In other words, it is non-ontological, in much the same sense as the idea of
the present moment itself is non-ontological.
I’m aware that Boltzmann’s hypothesis will strike some people as surprising and
controversial. In my view the case for accepting it is very strong, however, and has
been so for more than a century. As Boltzmann saw (at least darkly), it consists in an
appeal to what I’m calling Variability – the fact that physics seems to allow that there
could be creatures elsewhere with the opposite temporal orientation (and to provide no
sense in which their viewpoint is any worse than ours). The reason the hypothesis seems
surprising is that the features of our temporal outlook it treats as merely perspectival are
very deeply ingrained. We don’t find it easy to think of them as anything less than fully
objective, and it isn’t obvious where else the contagion will spread, when we attempt to
do so – and what else will get caught in the indexical net.
This last issue is my present concern. I think that much of ordinary modal and
causal thinking gets caught in the net, when the direction of time is rendered indexical
in this way. I don’t have space or time enough to argue the temporal case here, so I’ll
simply assume Boltzmann’s hypothesis in considering the causal case.
Again, the point turns on the pragmatic character of the distinctive role of indexical terms and
beliefs. Sometimes we need to explain the functional role of beliefs in terms of an ontological account
of what we take them to be beliefs about. But this isn’t a case of that kind.
In other words, it isn’t an objective matter whether entropy is actually increasing or decreasing in
our region of the universe – there isn’t a distinct possible world which differs simply in the fact that
everything is happening in the opposite temporal sense.

 Causation and the Three-fold Path
I’m interested in the project of leading causation down the Three-fold Path – in other
words, of showing that considerations closely analogous to those that support the non-
ontological interpretation of Perry’s essential indexicals also support a non-ontological
view of causal judgement. In a slogan, I want to show that causal judgments are index-
ical, too.
. Variability
Here there is certainly a contrast between the case of causation and that of the familiar
indexicals. With the latter, the possibility of inter-speaker variability is forced upon us
(though for slightly different reasons in the spatial, personal and temporal cases). In
the case of causation, however, it can easily appear that there is no such variation – that
we are all in the same boat, so to speak. But I think there are three reasons for regarding
causal judgments as similarly though less obviously variable:
. Causation and time’s arrow. As Russell already noted in his famous () paper,
our causal judgements seem to depend on accidental features of our temporal
constitution – e.g., as Russell puts it, on the fact that we remember the past but
not the future. While Russell didn’t have all the details worked out, I think his
intuitions were spot-on. Interestingly, much recent work on this topic consists in
reactions to a third seminal paper in that lucky thirteenth volume of Noûs from
, Lewis’s ‘Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow’ (Noûs, , –).
Discussion of the issue raised by Lewis has confirmed how hard it is to give an
“ontological” account of the apparent asymmetry and temporal orientation of
causation. At best, moreover, we seem to have to reduce it to something that
physics gives us reason to regard as an entirely contingent and possibly local
feature of our region of the universe, namely, the thermodynamic asymmetry. It
is doubtful whether this is basic enough, but in any case it allows for variation,
once we realise that physics allows for the possibility of creatures in regions in
which this asymmetry points the other way. Thus in the causation case it is
arguable that we get support for Variability from physics, if not in ordinary
life.
This is a big topic, of course, and even in physics our thinking about experimentation, counterfac-
tual reasoning, and the like, is still deeply conditioned by the causal view. (This is what makes the case
so interesting, of course . . . )

. Causation and orientation in epistemic space. There is a deeper point lurking
beneath Russell’s comment about the relevance of the fact that memory works
backwards and not forwards. Roughly, the causal arrow points from what we
know to what we don’t know, reflecting not ontological priority but epistemic
priority. (Actually, it points to a special subset of what we don’t know, namely,
what we take it we might fix by fiat – more on this in a moment.) Thus its
direction is associated with the orientation of a certain sort of boundary in what
we might call “epistemic space” – and if we imagine creatures for whom this
boundary runs differently, we are imagining creatures whose causal arrow differs
from ours.
Here’s an example of what I have in mind. Consider the perspective of someone
writing the prequels to the original Star Wars movies. The prequels are required
to be consistent with the original episodes, and hence choices about the later
times in the originals determine facts about earlier times in the prequels. If we
intervene to replace Luke Skywalker by Harry Potter in Episode , the ramifi-
cations will spread backwards as well as forwards in the temporal dimension of
the series. This is an illustration of how non-standard epistemic access leads to
non-standard causal arrows. With a little imagination, it is easy to support the
idea that our conventional standpoint is contingent and parochial, precisely as
the argument from Variability requires.
. Causation and contextuality. I think it is arguable that the familiar contextu-
ality of causation is best treated in these terms, as a kind of implicit epistemic
variability. I don’t have space to try to develop this idea here, and I think the
proposal is initially less telling than the above considerations – largely because
we are familiar with other ways of accommodating contextuality – but this is not
to say that the familiar ways will still seem the best ways, in the light of a deeper
understanding of the indexical character of causal judgements. But I leave this
on the table for future work.
. Parsimony
The parsimonious attractions of a non-ontological reading of causation begin to come
into view in Hume. Famously, Hume regarded the necessity associated with our ordi-
nary idea of causation as much better explained in tidy psychological terms, than added
as a mysterious ingredient in reality. Russell adds a new element to the argument, in
For more on this idea see my ‘Causal Perspectivalism’, in Huw Price and Richard Corry, eds.,
Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited (OUP, ), –.

the form of the argument that physics has no use for the notion of causation – though
arguably this was already apparent earlier, e.g. to positivists such as Mach. Perhaps
Russell’s main contribution was to call attention to the issue of time-asymmetry: the
lack of time-asymmetry in fundamental physics provides a powerful new element to
the case for parsimony.
However, it may be that the strongest ingredient in the case for parsimony has
only been coming into view in the past fifteen years or so (from a direction telling
related to Cartwright’s argument), in the form of what I’ll call interventionism – a new
understanding of the importance of notions of intervention and manipulation to our
understanding of causality. If we accept first that causation needs to be understood
in terms of intervention, and second that “natural” interventions are hard to find in
the physical world (at least in the required numbers), then we have a new motive for
seeking a non-ontological understanding of causation. Here are some remarks from
Judea Pearl on the latter point:
If you wish to include the entire universe in the model, causality disappears be-
cause interventions disappear – the manipulator and the manipulated loose [sic]
their distinction. However, scientists rarely consider the entirety of the universe
as an object of investigation. In most cases the scientist carves a piece from the
universe and proclaims that piece in – namely, the focus of investigation. The
rest of the universe is then considered out or background and is summarized by
what we call boundary conditions. This choice of ins and outs creates asymmetry
in the way we look at things and it is this asymmetry that permits us to talk about
“outside intervention” and hence about causality and cause–effect directionality.
. Genealogy
Interventionism is also an important step towards the kind of genealogical proposal that
would support a non-ontological view of causation (paralleling Perry’s understanding
of indexicals). Interventionism helps to bring the target into view. The genealogical
project is to try to show that, and how, creatures might benefit from representing their
world in terms of interventions, even if there are no corresponding “facts” (again, think
of the indexical parallel, if you are unsure what this would mean).
Pearl, J. . Causality, New York: Cambridge University Press, New York, at pp. –. Com-
pare this to what physics has taught us about say the temporal indexical: as Hermann Weyl puts it in a
famous passage in Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science (), “the world is, it does not happen.
Only in the gaze of my consciousness, crawling up the life-line of my body, does the world fleetingly
come to life.”

Nevertheless, the kind of functional story required for causation is apparently con-
siderably more complex than for indexicals. In my view, it is likely to involve an
intersection between two major elements:
The predictor’s perspective.
Inter alia, I think, causal notions are notions irreducibly associated with the
perspective of non-omniscient creatures, and inherit certain features from that
perspective: their conditional/hypothetical structure, and (in our case) a typical
temporal orientation, associated with the fact that we acquire knowledge from
the past but not the future. We have no non-inferential knowledge of the future,
but our welfare depends on what happens there – hence our interest in making
the best guesses we can, in the circumstances. In my view, the realisation that this
is our situation and our fate is the beginnings of a very fruitful approach to the
topics of natural law, probability and chance: in each case, roughly, we can see
why creatures in this situation should need (or at least profit by inventing) such
notions, and this is the beginnings of a genealogy. (Once again, the argument
for regarding this as a non-ontological account follows the three-fold path.)
The agent’s perspective.
Important as it is, however, the predictor’s perspective cannot be the full story
about the peculiar indexicality of causation. There is a new ingredient which
gets added to the picture only when the predictor is also an actor, whose own
actions lie in the epistemic field in question.
(The relation between these two is that any agent is necessarily non-omniscient, but not
every non-omniscient creature is necessarily an agent. We can imagine non-omniscient
creatures who are merely observers, at least in some specified realm.)
In my view, one of the complexities of thinking about causation by analogy with
indexicals is that some analogue of indexicality arises at both stages. The first stage is
closely related to the temporal perspective itself, and to what we might call the merely
predictive modalities of law and probability. Causation depends on this, and takes over
its epistemic asymmetry, but depends on a new element, that of agency. Thus causation
turns out to be doubly indexical, in my view.
However, it’s the second bit that matters in the present context. Accordingly, I want
to try to focus on the issue as to why probability as assessed from an agent’s point of view
is properly different from what we might call third-person probability. I’ll try to draw
a veil over the more ambitious claim that even “third-person” probability is necessarily
indexical in a deeper sense.

 The indexicality of agent probabilities
. Evidential autonomy
“[F]reedom consists, in part, in being free to believe what one wants about one’s own
actions.” – Joyce
I want to begin with some suggestive remarks by Jim Joyce.
[M]any decision theorists (both evidential and causal) have suggested that free
agents can legitimately ignore evidence about their own acts. Judea Pearl (a
causalist) has written that while “evidential decision theory preaches that one
should never ignore genuine statistical evidence . . . [but] actions – by their very
definition – render such evidence irrelevant to the decision at hand, for actions
change the probabilities that acts normally obey.” (, p. ) Pearl took this
point to be so important that he rendered it in verse:
Whatever evidence an act might provide
On facts that precede the act,
Should never be used to help one decide
On whether to choose that same act. (, p. )
Huw Price (an evidentialist) has expressed similar sentiments: “From the agent’s
point of view contemplated actions are always considered to be sui generis, un-
caused by external factors . . . This amounts to the view that free actions are
treated as probabilistically independent of everything except their effects.” (,
p. ) A view somewhat similar to Price’s can be found in Hitchcock ().
These claims are basically right: a rational agent, while in the midst of her de-
liberations, is in a position to legitimately ignore any evidence she might possess
about what she is likely to do. . . . A deliberating agent who regards herself as free
need not proportion her beliefs about her own acts to the antecedent evidence
that she has for thinking that she will perform them. Let’s call this the evidential
autonomy thesis.
It seems to me that Pearl’s verse makes a different point from the one that Joyce is
looking for – effectively, it is just the prescription that Causalists think we need, to
avoid Evidentialist mistakes. It doesn’t sufficiently stress the indexical character of the
deliberator’s viewpoint. It suggests that there is evidence but that actors should ignore
it, whereas the point should be that there isn’t evidence in the first place, from the actor’s
own perspective. Thus I think the point that Joyce is after is better put like this:
Jim Joyce, ‘Are Newcomb Problems Really Decisions?’, ms.

The evidence my choice to you would provide
On earlier matters of fact,
Is irrelevant to me as I decide
On whether to perform an act.
However, the main point I want to extract from these remarks by Joyce is that they
are indicative of what seems to be an emerging consensus that an agent’s epistemic
maps are necessarily “gappy” maps – they necessarily encode less information than
impersonal maps about the actions of the agent in question, as she deliberates about
those actions. Thus an agent’s subjective probabilities have to be “indexical” in a new
way – a way associated specifically with the fact that she is an agent. To repeat, this
isn’t just the general ‘subjectivity’ of any epistemic viewpoint – it is a new dimension of
indexicality, associated specifically with agency.
So far, however, this consensus falls short of what we need. We need to distinguish
two distinct modes of “gappiness”, associated with an agent’s conditional and uncondi-
tional probabilities, respectively. Some of the considerations in the above remarks bear
on the latter – on an agent’s unconditional probabilities concerning her own contem-
plated actions. But it is the distinctive character of the conditional probabilities that
matters to the genealogy of the causal viewpoint.
. Ramsey contingency: the deliberative blind-spot
Consider first the unconditional probability of a contemplated action, as considered
from the agent’s point of view. The crucial point is that an agent can’t meaningfully
assign credences to events which are the subject of a current deliberation. (She could
assign numbers, of course, it is just that they don’t count as credences in the normal
sense – they don’t guide betting, for example.) An agent puts a belief about what she
is going to do into her belief box – onto her epistemic map – as she decides to act
. . . but that only makes sense if it wasn’t there beforehand, from her point of view
(or, perhaps better, that whatever was there before is irrelevant – agentive freedom
trumps epistemic constraint, as it were). So an agent’s epistemic map must show terra
incognita, in regions of current deliberation. I take this to be a fundamental fact about
the cognitive phenomenology of agency, which I’ll call Ramsey contingency, because I
think it is what Ramsey had in mind when he said, “My present action is an ultimate
and the only ultimate contingency.”
We could put this in terms of the Principle Principal: an agent is bound to have “inadmissable”
information about her own actions, as she acts.

This fact about an agent’s probability space – the fact that it is undefined at con-
templated actions – shows already that agent probabilities differ from third-person
probabilities, in a distinctively “first-personal” kind of way. (It is precisely our own ac-
tions that occupy the blind-spot, after all.) However, this isn’t yet the difference crucial
to the causal perspective. For that, we need to turn to conditional probabilities. Recall
that the basis of Cartwright’s argument was that a merely evidential decision strategy
would err in the case of spurious correlations. To associate effective strategies with an
agent’s indexical probabilities, we need to show that an agent’s conditional probabilities
behave in the right way: in effect, that they ignore the spurious correlations present in
the third-person probabilities.
. From epistemic blind-spot to sphere of influence
The task of an agent is to find out what else wiggles, in response to her possible present
actions. This is a matter of accumulating judgements about conditional probabilities
– probabilities of outcomes, conditional on actions – but in the special probability space
associated with the agent’s perspective. In the typical case, these conditional probabilities
define a cone in spacetime, an expanding “sphere of influence”, defining all the possible
futures the agent takes to be under her control. (Events in this cone have no meaningful
unconditional probabilities, from the agent’s point of view, prior to her choice.)
Now the challenge. Aren’t spurious correlations a problem for this picture, as in
Cartwright’s insurance example and the so-called medical Newcomb problems? No,
in my view. Explaining exactly why not is a matter of some delicacy, but my own
view is that a crucial ingredient is to note that an agent who takes statistical data
to be applicable to her own case in such a situation is guilty of an error of statistical
reasoning: she is irrational, but not because she follows the wrong decision procedure.
Rather, the problem is that having made a judgement of conditional dependency – e.g.,
of the probability of her having the cancer gene, conditional on deciding to smoke –
she fails to take into account new relevant information about her own case, namely,
that she now holds that very same conditional credence. So if she makes the wrong
decision on this basis, the error is one of failing to assess probabilities correctly – in
effect, a failure of the principle of total evidence – not a problem with her decision
procedure.
In any case, as I also explain in Price (), this view is compatible with the claim
that giving causal information is a way of short-circuiting the possibility of such error,
Ignoring, e.g., backward causation, and the products of other strange epistemic constraints.
Defended in Price, H. , ‘Agency and Probabilistic Causality’, British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, , –.

by handing the agent the information she needs about her agent probabilities. This no
more implies that causal information needs to be ontologically basic than the fact that
I can hand you information about what time it is now shows that “now” must pick out
something ontologically basic.
Obviously, this needs to be spelled out at greater length. The point I want to
emphasise here is that in the conditional case, too, there is a reason why probabil-
ities assessed from an agent’s point of view are different from those assessed from a
third-person point of view, when the probabilities in question concern the agent’s own
actions – i.e., in this case, when they are probabilities of outcomes conditional on ac-
tions. Once again, then, we have the tell-tale signs of indexicality: a reason why an
agent’s way of thinking about her own situation (and its relevance to other matters) is
properly different from a third-person way of thinking about the same matters.
. Summary: an indexical genealogy for causal judgments?
This sketch suggests that the key elements of an indexical genealogy of causal judg-
ments are in place, or at least have some realistic prospect of being put into place.
Roughly, we have the outline of an understanding of why agents see matters in terms
of interventions – why their distinctive epistemic maps take that form. And hence, I
think, we have the beginnings of all three steps in the Three-fold Path, for the case
of causation – the beginnings of a case for thinking of interventionist causation as a
conceptual species of the same genus as Perry’s essential indexicals.
 Situating the view: comparison with Woodward
In a chapter of his recent book in which Woodward aims to contrast his own manipu-
lability account of causation with the (as he sees it, more subjective) view proposed by
Menzies and myself, he characterises his view as follows:
[O]n the view I am advocating, our notion of causality developed in response to
the fact that there are situations in which we could manipulate X, and by so doing
manipulate Y. This fact led us (..) to form the notion of a relationship between
There’s a separate issue about the classic Newcomb problem. There, one can have a divergence
between causal and evidential prescriptions, at least on a sufficiently realistic understanding of causation.
I argue: so much the worse for realistic understanding of causation; let’s use the analogy with the
Principal Principle (and the status of ‘inadmissible evidence’) to conclude that one-boxing should be
uncontroversial.
The reason, to repeat, is that judgments about such probabilities can feed into the very actions such
judgments are about, in a way which isn’t true of judgments made from the third-person perspective.

X and Y that would support such manipulations and to contrast this with the
notion of a mere correlation that would not support such manipulations. How-
ever, it is built into the notion of a relationship that will support manipulations
in this way that (..) such a relationship would continue to hold even if we do
not or cannot manipulate X, or if our beliefs and attitudes were different, or even
if we did not exist at all. If it is asked why (..) is built into our notion of cau-
sation, my response is that any other view of the matter would involve a bizarre
and magical way of thinking, according to which our ability to manipulate X or
our practical interest in manipulating X or our beliefs about the results of ma-
nipulating X somehow make it the case that a means–end connection comes into
existence between X and Y where this connection would not exist if we did not
have the ability or interest or beliefs in question. Taken literally, such a view, if
intelligible at all, would require human beings to have god-like powers that they
plainly do not possess. (Woodward : )
I want to make two responses to this challenge. First, I have argued that the indexical
term “we” in Woodward’s assertion that “our notion of causality developed in response
to the fact that there are situations in which we could manipulate” is ineliminable.
The judgement at the heart of claims about what we could manipulate is irreducibly
indexical, due the first-person character of the agent probabilities that it involves. This
is reflected in the fact that creatures with different epistemic “situations” would make
different judgements about what could be manipulated by manipulating what, and
there’s no objective sense in which we are right and they are wrong – to think otherwise
is to accord our viewpoint a god-like priority that as Woodward says, it plainly does
not possess. (Here, as in many other cases in the history of science and philosophy, it is
the modest, ‘subjectivist’, Copernican view that does the better job of recognising the
contingencies and limitations of the human standpoint; and the objectivist view that
confuses us with gods.)
Second, the analogy with more familiar indexicals reveals that something likeWood-
ward’s (..) can hold, even in cases in which which the non-ontological status of the
facts in question is not in doubt: if this is Sydney and today is Sunday, then my think-
ing or desiring otherwise won’t make any difference; nor would my non-existence, or
yours. So these kinds of facts have the kind of ‘solidity’ and objectivity that Wood-
ward thinks that subjectivists must deny to causal facts . . . and yet the here moves, as
Galileo might put it. We all agree (I take it) that the distinction between indexical
and non-indexical “facts” is not a distinction between two elements of reality. It is a
distinction between two ways of representing reality, the former being essential to us
in virtue of certain features of our own situation. If this is right, then Woodward’s
intuitions about the observer-independence of causal facts would seem to be no bar to

an indexical reading in that case, too: the kind of reading I’ve argued to be pressed on
us by the recognition of the potential variability of the manipulator’s perspective.
The passage I quoted above from Woodward’s book continues as follows:
This conclusion is reinforced by the naturalistic, evolutionary perspective en-
dorsed in chapter . According to subjectivist accounts, causal relationships have
their source in facts about us – facts about our expectations, attitudes, and so
on – which we “project” on to the world. If we think about this claim in the
light of the argument of section ., the subjectivist picture looks rather peculiar.
To begin with, what is the evolutionary story about the benefits we derive from
this projective activity? After all, our projectivist tendencies systematically lead to
beliefs that, by the subjectivist’s own account, are mistaken or ungrounded – mis-
taken in the sense that they ascribe a false objectivity to causal claims or involve
thinking of the distinction between causal and correlational claims as having an
objective basis in nature rather than in facts about us. Why should we and other
animals go to the trouble of distinguishing between causal and correlational re-
lationships if all that is “really out there” in the world are correlations? All that
projecting seems wasteful and gratuitous. (Woodward , –)
Once again, I want reply by calling attention to the analogy with familiar indexicals.
In this case, Perry offers us the beginnings of an understanding “about the benefits we
derive from this projective activity”, as Woodward puts it. To paraphrase Woodward
some more, why should we go to the trouble of distinguishing between here and there,
now and then, self and other, if all that is “really out there” in the world are the bare
non-indexical facts? All that projecting seems wasteful and gratuitous. Well, Perry and
others have shown us why it isn’t wasteful and gratuitous, in the indexical case. On the
contrary, as Perry puts it, the indexical is essential, for creatures in our circumstances:
creatures who need to coordinate their own actions and observations with third-person
maps of their environment.
This passage continues with the following challenge:
Moreover, why do our projective activities take the particular form they do? In some cases, a single co-occurrence
is sufficient for belief in a causal connection, whereas in other cases, repeated co-occurrences have no such effect.
Why is this? Saying that what distinguishes causal relationships from mere correlations are facts about our
attitudes and projective activities gives us no insight into why our attitudes are such that they lead us to interpret
a single episode of mushroom consumption followed by nausea as indication that the former causes the latter, but
do not lead us to make a similar inference when confronted with evidence of an extensive correlation between
purchase of life insurance and increased longevity. (Woodward , )
I have argued that this issue is taken care of by the reflexive character of agent probabilities. In the
usual cases of spurious correlation, such as Cartwright’s TIAA example, the fact that a judgement of
conditional dependency would screen off the very correlation on which it should supposedly be based
ensures that there can be no such dependency, from the agent’s distinctive (reflexive) point of view.

I’ve suggested that Perry’s project be seen as a beacon for the causal case, too. I’ve
argued that Variability and Parsimony recommend an indexical reading of causal be-
liefs – less obviously, certainly, than in the case of the spatial, temporal and personal
indexicals, but the basic motivations are the same. This leaves the task of completing
the genealogy, but here, I think, the work of Woodward, Pearl and others provides a
very large part of what we need. Above all, it begins to show us why natural crea-
tures in our situation – creatures with limited information, capable of acting in their
own environment – should benefit by representing that environment in causal terms.
What the indexical analogy provides is a framework to assess the metaphysical signif-
icance of these results. And the biggest element in this assessment – the element that
speaks loudest for the modest, non-ontological interpretation – is the recognition of
the importance of the sheer contingencies of our temporal and epistemic situations.
William James characterised pragmatism as a view that looked for “the trail of the
human serpent” in our concepts and conceptual schemes. In the case of the temporal,
epistemic and agentive aspects of conceptual schemes, in my view, James’s metaphor is
inappropriately delicate: the human contribution is more elephant than serpent, and
it is only the familiarity of our temporal viewpoint that prevents us from seeing this
substantial creature, sitting squarely in the middle of our field of view. We mistake
the shape of the elephant for the shape of reality, as it were, taking for granted that
our peculiar epistemic, temporal and agentive perspective is a view of the world in
itself. But what a true commitment to naturalism demands is a willingness always
to challenge the appearances, always to ask whether we can explain why things should
look this way to creatures of our particular nature, in our particular circumstances. This
is the genuinely progressive, genuinely naturalistic project, in my view, and nowhere is
it more interesting and more important than in the case of causation. What appeals
to me about the analogy with Perry’s treatment of the essential indexical is the way it
seems to provide new traction for this crucial project – a new lever to convince us that
the elephant is a moveable beast, so to speak, and not part of the furniture after all.
This piece is greatly indebted to discussions with Jenann Ismael over several years. I am also grateful
to audiences in College Park, Armidale, Tilburg and Venice for comments on recent versions. My
research is supported by the Australian Research Council and the University of Sydney.

